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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent economic recession has forced companies to tighten the reins on expenses and fraud is 
one expense that companies cannot afford. Fraud, however, is becoming a much larger problem 
for business. This actual fraud case by an employee at a privately held company details how a $9 
million embezzlement fraud was committed and detected. This case highlights the identification of 
the fraud, analysis through the use of the fraud triangle and the weaknesses in the internal control 
of the organization. This case identifies auditing issues and fraud examination procedures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Public Company Fraud 
 
n the mid 1990’s a surge of corporate frauds occurred in the U.S. beginning with Enron. Kenneth Lay, 
founder of Enron, through the use of accounting loopholes, formed special purpose entities where Lay hid 
billions in Enron debt from shareholders.  
 
In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed civil fraud charges against three former top 
executives of Tyco, including former CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski, alleging that they failed to disclose multi-million 
dollar low interest and interest-free loans they took from the company and, in some cases, never repaid. According 
to the indictment, Kozlowski borrowed $9 million to buy property in Florida and $7 million to buy a Park Avenue 
apartment in Manhattan for his wife as part of a divorce settlement. Kozlowski was also charged with awarding 
himself a $56 million bonus and CFO Mark Swartz a $28 million bonus, neither of which was disclosed to the board 
of directors. They also used millions in company money to buy homes, yachts, and jewelry. The accounting firm, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, later agreed to pay $225 million to settle a lawsuit brought by shareholders of Tyco over a 
multibillion-dollar accounting fraud. PricewaterhouseCoopers failed to uncover fraud in the accounting scandal and, 
as a result, Tyco overstated its income by $5.8 billion. 
 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) has conducted studies on the incidence of fraud for 
companies that were cited by the SEC for financial reporting fraud. “For the 10-year period 1998 to 2007, COSO 
found the amount and incidences remain high. The total amount of fraud was more the $120 billion spread across 
just 300 companies and the SEC’s most commonly cited motivations for fraud included the need to meet internal or 
external earnings expectations”1  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Rittenberg, L. Johnstone, K. & Gramling, A. (2012) Auditing A Business Risk Approach. Mason OH; South-Western Cengage 
Learning (459). 
I 
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Private Company Fraud 
 
Fraud is not confined to large companies or top executives. It can be perpetrated by any member of the 
organization. One study estimated that 85% of the worst fraud cases were conducted by insiders on the payroll.
2
  
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the median loss caused by occupational frauds 
was $159,000. Nearly one-quarter of the cases caused at least $1 million in losses and nine cases caused losses of $1 
billion or more. Participants estimate U.S. organizations lose 5% of their annual revenue to fraud which, when 
applied to the 2006 United States Gross Domestic Product, would translate to approximately $652 billion in fraud 
losses. (ACFE 2006) 
 
Small businesses, however, suffer a disproportionate amount of fraud losses. The median loss suffered by 
organizations with fewer than 100 employees was $190,000 per scheme which was higher than the median loss in 
even the largest organizations. The most common occupational frauds in small businesses involve employees 
fraudulently writing company checks, skimming revenues, and processing fraudulent invoices. (ACFE 2006) 
 
Privately held businesses are not subject to the auditing requirements for internal control as are publicly 
held companies. Therefore, these companies do not monitor internal controls or have effective detective measures in 
place. Less than 10% of small businesses had anonymous fraud reporting systems and less than 20% had internal 
audit departments, conducted surprise audits, or conducted fraud training for their employees and managers. (ACFE 
2006) Most frauds in small business are detected by customer reports or by accident instead of due to proactive 
detection methods. 
 
The size of the loss caused by occupational fraud is strongly related to the position of the perpetrator. 
Frauds committed by owners or executives caused a median loss of $1 million. This is nearly five times more than 
the median loss caused by managers and almost 13 times as large as the median loss caused by employees. Most of 
the occupational fraud schemes involved either the accounting department or upper management. Just over 30% of 
the occupational frauds were committed by employees in the accounting department. (ACFE 2006)  
 
Regulations to Detect Fraud  
 
The fraud discovered at public companies demanded action and both Congress and the accounting 
profession reacted. Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a federal law that set new standards for all 
US publicly held companies. The Sarbanes-Oxley act requires management to implement internal controls over 
financial reporting and to certify that the controls have been implemented properly and are operating effectively.  
 
The accounting profession, also in 2002, reacted with the issuance of The Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (SAS 99). SAS 99 requires an auditor to maintain an 
attitude of professional skepticism recognizing that the possibility of fraud may exist. “The Center for Audit Quality 
describes professional skepticism as involving the validation of information through probing questions, the critical 
assessment of evidence, and attention to inconsistencies.” 3 
 
SAS 99 provides for an approach that starts at the planning stage with consideration given to the likelihood 
that fraud may exist. The planning process is meant to alert auditors to ‘red flags’ or potential fraud factors to 
address. These red flags include: 
 
 The auditor should understand the nature of fraud, including the types of fraud, the motivation to commit 
fraud, and the manner in which it may be perpetrated.  This includes being aware of incentives, opportunity 
and rationalization on the part of the fraudster. 
 Inquiries of management and others in the entity 
 Evaluation and review of audit evidence 
                                                 
2 Ernst & Young, Fraud: The Unmanaged Risk; 8th Global Survey, 2002. 
3 Rittenberg, L. Johnstone, K. & Gramling, A. (2012) Auditing A Business Risk Approach. Mason OH; South-Western Cengage 
Learning (462). 
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This case details a $9 million embezzlement at a leading landscape and masonry supplier in Massachusetts, 
how it happened and how it was detected. The case highlights the need to focus on basic fraud examination 
procedures. This case can be utilized in a fraud examination or auditing course. Students are exposed to a real fraud 
situation including the magnitude of the amount, the length of time the fraud continued, the discovery of the fraud, 
and the eventual judicial conclusion.  The students learn to apply the fraud triangle as incorporated in SAS 99 and 
identify the red flags of fraud.  
 
BACKGROUND 
 
According to the company website, J & J Materials Corp, located in Rehoboth, Massachusetts, is a leading 
landscape and masonry supplier in the Rhode Island and southeastern Massachusetts area. The company supplies 
items such as concrete paving stones for patios, walkways and outdoor landscaping.  The company sells bricks, 
decorative stone and landscaping supplies. The products are high quality and are meant to be decorative, functional 
and are eco-friendly. (http://jjmaterials.com/)  J & J Materials is one of several related entities. “Additional 
corporations under the ownership of John Ferreira, the owner of J & J Materials, include Ferreira Construction Inc., 
Nantucket Pavers Inc., Blackstone Investments Inc., and JJP Realty Inc. All entities operate in the construction, 
landscaping and real estate industries.”4  
 
Angela Buckborough Platt (Platt) was born in 1963, the youngest of three children. Her father worked as a 
financial analyst for a construction company and her mother suffered from mental illness. Her father’s job required 
frequent moves and by the time she was a teenager, Platt lived in four different east coast states and Great Britain. 
Her teen years were difficult. Her siblings excelled in school, but she did not. Platt failed in college and later 
accepted a job as a payroll clerk in upstate New York. In this job, she did well and was promoted to supervisor of 
accounts receivable and later moved on to a financial management position with a conference management 
company; but living alone in White Plains, New York, was overwhelming and Platt relocated to Oregon in 1991. 
She began work in the tourism industry and met widower Kevin Platt. They married in 1992 and had two children. 
Platt, however, longed for the east coast and the family moved to Cumberland Rhode Island. Platt found work with J 
& J Materials while her husband remained unemployed. (U.S. District Court 2007) 
 
A Trusted Employee 
 
J & J Materials hired Platt as a part-time bookkeeper in December 1998 and the owner was so pleased with 
her performance that he offered her a full time position the next year. John Ferreira, owner of J & J Materials, grew 
up on a farm in Massachusetts. He did not attend college but had a knack for business. His construction company 
had grown tremendously when the economy was booming. On a whim, he started J & J Materials as small retail 
operation selling stone to small contractors from a trailer. It grew to several locations and grossed millions. “In 1997 
he purchased Nantucket Pavers for $285,000 and it grew into a multimillion dollar business selling patio blocks to 
Home Depot. “5 Ferreira enjoyed his success, owning a helicopter at one point. Over the years, he purchased and 
sold several businesses and “as a result, he controlled approximately a dozen companies, each with their own 
financials in an enterprise that grossed $25 million a year.”6 
 
Platt was a trusted employee and soon was overseeing the finances of four companies. However, Platt was 
having difficulty paying the rent and fearing eviction, she stole her first $650 from her employer and no one noticed. 
From there it escalated. She started small, but by 2002 she had taken nearly $360,000. She would come to work 
dressed as she always had and lived in a modest home. Her only extravagance seemed once a year, when she and her 
husband would go all out decorating their home for Halloween.  
 
 
                                                 
4 U.S District Court of Massachusetts, United States of America v. Angela Buckborough Platt Defendant. Case 1:07-cr-10028. 
5 Swidey, N. (2006, September 17). The Inside Job; The Boss Thought she was the Hardest Working Person on his Payroll, 
Maybe She was, It’s not so Easy Building And Hiding An Extravagant, Second Life with Xompany Money But How Could A Scam 
This Big Go Unnoticed for So Long? The Boston Globe, 1-4. 
6 Id. 
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Some Questions  
 
Platt’s husband did not work, staying at home to raise the children. He and Platt had a passion for 
Halloween and in October their house transformed into everything spooky. “He had animatronic ghouls, a skeleton 
in the driver's seat of a customized Buick hearse, and a 20-foot monster called ‘The Slayer.’ The display inevitably 
drew the attention of the local papers and TV stations and then so many drive-bys that Platt and her husband had to 
hire a nightly police detail. Platt's co-workers took notice. Some carpooled to check out the scene, among them 
Cheryl Santos, Ferreira's sister and credit manager.  She liked Platt, but after seeing the overblown Halloween 
display, she had to ask, "How can you afford all that?" Platt explained that her husband, Kevin, had built some of the 
attractions, and persuaded people to loan him the rest.”7 
 
There were other things, however, that did not seem to fit. “Santos remembered that Platt once remarked 
that she had property in Vermont. Santos knew Platt made just over $40,000 a year and her husband did not have a 
job, but Platt had a ready answer. She said her in-laws had given them a spit of land with a junky trailer. Santos 
could accept that, but she never understood a much smaller matter. "She bought lunch every single day - and not just 
a sub or something. She'd get takeout from Applebee’s, from Chili's. I mean, jeepers crow, that adds up!" 8 
 
Meanwhile, Platt was feeling pressure from elsewhere at work. The general manager of the Nantucket 
Pavers plant often found the inventory and profit and-loss reports that Platt gave him didn't make sense. “Nantucket 
was in the black, but just not by what he thought it should be. "Jesus, I know we're doing well," he said, "and it's not 
showing." When he would point out errors to Platt, she would respond dismissively, saying she would look into it, 
but then never get back to him. The manager took his concerns to Ferreira, but the boss was more worried about his 
companies that weren't making money.”9  
 
Ferreira had his different business operations each in its own entity and Platt handled the books and the 
cash for several entities. When the auditors arrived they sought to obtain the bank statements directly from the 
banks. “Ferreira thought that was a waste of time. He designated one of his most trustworthy employees as the point 
person to work with the auditors. "Platt will give you anything you need," he told them. "She's got it all under 
control."
10
 
 
Spending the Money 
 
Platt had a passion for horses and purchased several thoroughbreds for her daughter. In 2004 Platt and her 
husband began construction on a log cabin on 100 acres in rural picturesque Vermont. The cabin had two kitchens 
with marble floors, four substantial bedrooms, each with its own private bathroom. The basement had a media room 
and a hand carved pool table. The garage was large enough to house a growing collection of vehicles while the 
upper level had a video arcade. The Vermont tax assessor valued the estate at an amount in excess of $1 million. 
When construction was complete, the Platts held a party with an extravagant menu including fresh lobster. There 
were endless refreshments and a full band. When the neighbors inquired about the apparent wealth of their new 
neighbors, Platt said she was the CEO of several profitable companies. (Marcelo, P 2006) 
 
Later that year the Platts decided they needed yet another home, as the ride to Vermont was over 200 miles 
from their home in Cumberland, Rhode Island, so they purchased a four bedroom home with an in-house movie 
theatre in Foster, Rhode Island, just 20 minutes away, for $500,000.  
 
Still no one at J& J Materials realized that anything was wrong. Initially, when Platt began, she would write 
checks out of one of the company accounts and deposit into her personal account. Later, she would write checks 
from one company to another company and then to herself. By the end of 2005, she had embezzled $1 million in a 
matter of two months. (Swidey N, 2006) 
                                                 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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Meanwhile, at J & J Materials, Ferreira was consolidating and Platt would be moved from the corporate 
office, beginning in 2006, to Nantucket Pavers. She would no longer be handling the books for several companies as 
several companies had been sold. She would focus all her attention on Nantucket Pavers. However, the manager 
there did not trust Platt and therefore hired a bookkeeper in mid-2006. The new bookkeeper found some of Platt’s 
accounting practices difficult to follow. When invoices did not reconcile to inventory, Platt instructed her to simply 
override them to make them agree, rather than researching the discrepancy. In subsequent weeks, the bookkeeper 
noticed checks being written on Wednesdays, when it was usually done only on Fridays. Once when she asked Platt 
why the last page of a bank statement was missing, Platt told her that the credit manager had a habit of throwing 
those out. (Swidey N., 2006) 
 
Signs of a Problem 
 
When the bookkeeper arrived, Platt decreased the number of checks she was writing to herself but soon she 
began again. She needed the money. Platt had hired a staff of professionals to arrange a spectacular June wedding 
reception for her brother and his fiancé at her Vermont retreat. “A horticulturist was brought in to build an elaborate 
English garden for the day, a sound-and-lighting specialist was flown in from California, and an event planner was 
charged with arranging paid hotel rooms for 200 guests, limos, catering, and live entertainment. Platt had signed 
contracts promising a 20-minute performance by Riverdance's 30-member touring troupe (at a cost of $60,000, plus 
an estimated $200,000 in expenses) and a one-hour show by singer/composer Burt Bacharach (at a cost of $95,000, 
plus an estimated $300,000 in expenses).”11 
 
As Platt was planning the lavish wedding in Vermont, the bookkeeper started asking questions. 
The bookkeeper spotted questionable records for several checks, totaling over $70,000. The checks were posted to 
different vendors of Nantucket Pavers, but the amounts were large. The bookkeeper called each vendor to see if the 
invoice number was correct and asked if the check was received. The vendors each replied that there was no such 
invoice, purchase or check received. The bookkeeper then contacted the bank and all the checks had been cashed, 
but they were paid to several of Ferreira's inactive companies. 
 
Discovery 
 
The vice president retrieved the cancelled checks from the bank. “The vice president called him from the 
bank saying,”I'm looking at a check here for $44,000 made out to Angela Buckborough." "Bring the check back 
here", Ferreira said. "I'll call the police and call her in." His mind was racing, but he was still hoping this was a one-
time thing. Around 4 p.m., Ferreira called Platt into the conference room. There she found the vice president and 
two Rehoboth police officers. After she waived her Miranda rights, Ferreira slid a copy of the $44,000 check across 
the table to her. "Do you know anything about this?"  
 
She didn't blink. "Yes. I've been stealing money." 
 
"How much?" 
 
"About $200,000." 
 
"Two hundred thousand dollars! What have you done with it?" 
12
 
 
Court records indicate that over a 6-year period, Angela Buckborough Platt stole approximately $6.9 
million from J & J Materials. The stolen money was used for a monumental shopping spree that included a 100 acre 
ranch in Vermont with a heated saltwater swimming pool, a Colonial style home in Foster, 30 acres of land in 
Maine, timeshares in Disney World, eight show horses, and five all-terrain vehicles. Also purchased was a fleet of 
27 motor vehicles, including a 1964 Ford Thunderbird, a 1928 Ford, a 1923 Model T customized into a novelty car 
fashioned as a green monster, a 1986 Jaguar, a 1937 Chevy panel car with a mural depicting the movie characters 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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Bonnie and Clyde, a 1920’s beer truck, and a 1927 Ford Roadster, to name a few. Halloween enthusiasts, the Platts 
purchased Hollywood cinematic props to decorate for Halloween, including a 20-foot smoking dragon and six 
talking trees, along with a life-size ceramic statute of Al Capone. The Platts also purchased a $17,000 diamond stud 
earring, mounted animals and themed vacation trips. The Platts lavishly furnished all their homes and hosted 
elaborate parties. They liberally bought gifts for friends, including vacation travel. In Vermont, they regularly would 
pick up the tab for everyone in the restaurant.  
 
The auditors found the embezzlement to be $6.7 million while Platt confessed to $9 million. A Rhode 
Island Superior Court judge ordered Platt, and her husband as an admitted accomplice, to pay Ferreira $16 million, 
including penalties, in addition to the $2 million worth of personal property that she already turned over to him. Platt 
pleaded guilty to interstate transportation of stolen property and the US District Court of Massachusetts 
recommended a period of imprisonment of no less than 55 months.  
 
LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
 
1. Apply Cressey’s Fraud Triangle  
 
Donald Cressey was interested in what led persons to become overcome by temptation and, as such, he 
developed the hypothesis that would be known as the fraud triangle. The first leg of the triangle represents perceived 
non-shareholder financial need, the second leg represents perceived opportunity, and the third leg stands for 
rationalization. (Wells, 2011) 
 
Cressey found that non-shareable problems fell into several basic categories, including personal failure, 
business reversals, status-gaining, and employer-employee relations. Perceived pressure is the motivation for the 
fraud which can be financial need. Perceived opportunity can be the result of poor internal controls which create the 
ability. Rationalization allows perpetrators an excuse for what they are doing. (Wells, 2011)  
 
Cressey found that when one has non-shareable financial pressure, it generally can be solved by theft of 
cash or other assets. A basic and important premise of Cressey’s fraud triangle hypothesis is that all three pieces of 
the triangle must be present in order for fraud to occur. There must fist exist the financial pressure to steal. When the 
pressure culminates, the employee looks for opportunities to commit fraud to relieve the pressure. The individual 
who has the need and the opportunity will then rationalize the action. 
 
In this case, Platt had a need as she was the only support for the family and she could not pay the rent. The 
opportunity presented itself when Ferreira put trust in her. Ferreira gave her control of the bookkeeping and check-
writing functions of several companies. Platt would later rationalize that she considered herself the CEO.  
 
Perceived Pressure  
 
The non-shareable problems of Platt fall into two categories according to Cressey. First, there is business 
reversals which include individuals that see their problems as arising from conditions out of their control, such as 
economic downturns. In this case, the first check Platt wrote was to cover the rent because her husband was 
unemployed and she feared eviction of her family. The second category to consider is status gaining. Here, 
individuals are motivated by a desire to improve their status or living beyond their means. Cressey felt that it was 
not the desire for a better lifestyle that creates the problem; rather, it is the inability to obtain the finer things in life 
through legitimate means and, at the same time, unwillingness to settle for a lower status that creates the motivation 
for the trust violation. (Wells, 2011) 
 
In this case, Platt is clearly motivated by the finer things in life as demonstrated by the numerous houses, 
cars, toys and furnishings, none of which she could have afforded on her own.  
 
The perceived pressure of Platt began as a financial need to pay the rent and then it went on to include 
maintaining a lifestyle far beyond what her income would support. Her husband enjoyed collecting vehicles and she 
embezzled enough to purchase 27 for him. Platt had a family to support, which she was doing without the help of 
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her husband who was unemployed; there was no extra money for frills. Instead, Platt owned horses and several 
houses with elaborate furnishings, like heated swimming pools, arcades and theatres. She was also generous beyond 
what her income would support, picking up the check for strangers in restaurants, bestowing vacations for friends, 
and throwing her brother a lavish wedding.  
 
Perceived Opportunity 
 
A fraud as extensive as this, involving several companies and as large as this - $9 million - required 
substantial knowledge of the accounting system. Platt was hired as a part-time bookkeeper and within a few months 
was full time. She worked diligently and quietly, but it appears that the system was not very complicated. Platt had 
gained the trust of Ferreira and was immediately given a great deal of responsibility. She was allowed to handle the 
books of several entities without question. She maintained all the bank statements. She also did not appear to have a 
supervisor to report to. This, along with the lack of internal controls, allowed the fraud to happen. 
 
Rationalization  
 
Platt did plead guilty to the crime of embezzlement and in the plea agreement she mentioned a difficult 
childhood and failure in college. It is possible that Platt felt she deserved the lavish lifestyle. Platt also had control 
over several of the entities; it is possible that she thought of it has her business. When in Vermont, she told 
neighbors that she was in fact the CEO of several companies. She may also have rationalized that it was alright to 
take the funds because no one was hurt. The lifestyle of the owner was not diminished and the companies survived 
the embezzlement.  
 
2. Identify the ‘Red Flags’ of SAS 99 
 
SAS 99 requires the auditor to gather information in order to identify the risks of material misstatement due 
to fraud. These red flags, when viewed with professional skepticism, may uncover fraudulent activities. If the checks 
were reviewed in this case, it would have been an immediate red flag as Platt made out the checks to herself 
personally. Another red flag would have been the amount for, at times, Platt made very large payments to herself. If 
someone had reviewed the bank statement, the unusually large amounts would have been noted as well as the fact 
that not all the pages of the bank statement were available. Red flags existed in the fact that Platt was allowed to 
write all the checks as well; there was no additional signature required. If anyone had examined the dormant 
corporations, it would be noted that transactions were running through these corporations even though there should 
have been no activity. The size and volume of activity in these corporations would have been a red flag.  
 
Red flags include lifestyle changes. It was noted that an employee had some suspicions on Platt being able 
to live on her income of $40,000 and be able to order out for lunch every day. The employees also knew of her 
elaborate Halloween displays that had to be expensive. She also spoke of the home in Vermont. Platt had many 
unusual items - a fleet of 27 cars and an interest in horses - and was spending time in Vermont. She also had a new 
home in Foster, Rhode Island, but no one in the organization thought this was cause for concern.  Discussions with 
the owner would be a red flag when he revealed that Platt handled everything.  
 
3. Identify the weaknesses in Internal Control 
 
Platt was able to carry on the fraud for the length of time and the dollar amount because of the poor internal 
controls at J & J Materials. The internal control framework for most U.S. companies is the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control—Integrated Framework. (L. Rittenberg, K. 
Johnstone, & A. Gramling, 2012) There are five elements of internal control: 
 
 The Control Environment 
 Risk Assessment 
 Control Activities 
 Information and Communication 
 Monitoring 
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The control environment is concerned with the actions, policies, and procedures that reflect the overall 
attitude of management of an entity about internal control and its importance. Management needs to aim for 
integrity, ethical values and commitment to competence. Management must lead by example, for through its 
activities, it provides signals to employees about the importance of internal control. When the model of management 
is unacceptable behavior, the result will be an ineffective control environment. In this case, Platt had no supervision 
and the owner had no concerns about viewing the bank statements and had no problem giving Platt full authority of 
the checkbook. The employees could have reported inconsistencies to management, but there was a tone from 
management that it was not important. The owner failed in his responsibility as there was no communication from 
management of behavioral standards by codes of conduct and example. Management, through its activities, should 
provide clear signals to employees about the importance of internal control. Management failed in its responsibility 
by allowing Platt to handle all financial matters without requiring supporting documentation. The low or nonexistent 
level of management scrutiny, along with weak internal control, was an invitation to fraud.  
 
Risk Assessment includes management’s identification and analysis of risks relevant to the preparation of 
the financial statements in accordance with GAAP. Management should design internal controls in order to 
minimize errors and fraud and to do this management should identify factors that may increase risk, determine the 
risk of the occurrence of fraud, and take any necessary actions to minimize risk. The owner of J & J Materials gave 
no consideration to internal controls or the risk of fraud. He simply trusted Platt and gave her enormous authority 
over the finances of numerous corporations. There should have been consideration given to the risk of fraud.  
 
Control activities are the policies and procedures that management has established to meet its objectives for 
financial reporting. Control procedures should include: 
 
 Adequate segregation of duties 
 Proper authorization of transactions and activities 
 Adequate documents and records 
 Physical control over assets and records 
 Independent checks on performance 
 
This was clearly a problem in this case. Typical segregation of duties includes separation of the functions 
of authorization, recordkeeping, and custody. In this case, there was no segregation of duties. Platt had exclusive 
control of check-writing, accounting and bank statement reconciliation. Platt also had custody of the checkbook 
allowing her to make transfers to herself and since she also reconciled the statements, management did not realize 
what she was doing. The reconciliation should have been performed by an independent person who had no authority 
to write checks, make deposits or execute transfers between accounts.  
 
There was no system of authorization in place. There was no limitation on Platt’s authority; she did not 
need approval to make transfers or payments. Only her signature was needed on checks and for transfers. There was 
no audit trail available in this case. Platt would remove the pages of the bank statements that would implicate her. 
The auditors received the bank statements from Platt rather than the bank.  
 
Documentation at this company was lax. Platt was able to pay vendors and herself without any 
documentation. Adequate documentation includes the use of pre-numbered consecutive documents prepared in 
conjunction with the transaction. All documentation went through Platt. The manager at Nantucket Pavers did not 
understand the inventory numbers and was not able to receive any documentation because control of the documents 
rested with Platt, and finally, there were no independent checks in this company. There should be procedures in 
place in order to check the performance of employees.  
 
Information and communication are the methods used to initiate, record, process, and report an entity’s 
transactions and to maintain accountability for related assets.  A company of this size and with several entities 
requires a system that includes carefully defined responsibilities and written procedures.  There was no system in 
place for J & J Materials. The company grew over the years to where it was very profitable, but the accounting 
controls did not grow with the company. There were no defined lines of responsibility and as long as the business 
was doing well, employees and cash positions were not reviewed.  
Journal of Business Case Studies – November/December 2012 Volume 8, Number 6 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  583 
CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, Platt was able to perform multiple functions and her work was not reviewed in any way or 
by anyone. It was not reviewed by the owner or the auditor. Because there were no controls, Platt was able to 
embezzle greater and greater amounts and it went undetected.  
 
In order to improve the controls and prevent fraud, the company should have segregated duties. Other 
preventative measures include dollar limitations on check signing authority or requiring a second signature for check 
amounts over a certain dollar amount. The company also should have had measures in place requiring approval for 
bank transfers. These controls are basic, but if they had been in place, the embezzlement and the magnitude of it 
would not have happened.  
 
If management focuses on the fraud triangle and tries to eliminate the points of the triangle, the risk of 
fraud should decrease. The company might consider an employee loan program in order to reduce pressure on 
employees who have hit hard times. An employee assistance program of this type, or something similar, would not 
only decrease the pressure on the employee, but it would alert management to any possible problems. The 
opportunity leg of the triangle could be handled by an increase in internal control; namely, segregation of duties. 
Management also needs to deal with the rationalization leg of the triangle and set a goal of not enabling employees 
to rationalize committing fraud on the company. Management, from the owner down, needs to have a specific ethics 
policy that all in the company must adhere to. The policy must encourage all employees to report possible 
wrongdoings and it must state that anyone caught committing fraud will be prosecuted. The company could consider 
an anonymous reporting system about any areas of concern.  
 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 applies to publicly held companies, but as the research of ACFE shows, 
fraud is much more prevalent in privately held companies. Sarbanes-Oxley focused on increasing and strengthening 
internal controls and corporate governance which are clearly applicable and appropriate in a privately held 
organization as well.  
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